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1 INTRODUCTION  
A major mission of the United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is to monitor 
compliance in the states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other 
non-proliferation agreements.  FSU countries are dismantling nuclear weapons and storing the associated 
weapons origin Plutonium in potentially monitored facilities (e.g., the Fissile Material Storage Facility 
(FMSF) at Mayak, Russia). The DTRA has recognized the need for effective verification of non-
proliferation undertakings monitoring of weapons origin nuclear material and activities.  
The attainment of DTRA’s goal of assuring nuclear non-proliferation compliance in the FSU will rely on 
the establishment of an integrated monitoring system which uses a sound conceptual and technical 
framework, employing modern and internationally accepted techniques, to facilitate the deployment of 
new technologies to strengthen systems (e.g. to provide improved surveillance techniques, remote 
monitoring and environmental sampling). 
Two of the essential techniques needed by such a framework are standardized approaches for the 1) 
specification of Information Technology security functions, and 2) a standardized assessment approach to 
verify the implementation of such required functions in the equipment to be deployed. 
This document concentrates on the identification of a standardized assessment approach for the 
verification of security functionality in specific equipment, the Inventory Sampling Measurement System 
(ISMS) being developed for Mayak. [Kouzes2001a]  Specifically, an Authentication Assurance Level 3 
(AAL3) is proposed to be reached in authenticating the ISMS. [Kouzes2001b] 
A standardized approach for the specification of security functions is outside the primary scope of this 
document, although ISO/IEC 14508, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation 
[CC], which is referenced extensively in this document, addresses both the specification of security 
functions and the assessment of their implementation.  The Common Criteria has been adopted by 14 
countries including the United States. In the FSU, the Russian Federation (RF) is undertaking to adopt the 
Common Criteria. 
1.1 Objective 
The primary objective of this paper is to define information technology (IT) security evaluation criteria 
for the Mayak ISMS equipment system and application software that are based on internationally 
accepted criteria and are appropriate and effective for re-use in subsequent nuclear non-proliferation 
compliance monitoring equipment systems.  This calls for the definition of appropriate and effective 
methodologies and procedures for specifying and authenticating the functionality of monitoring 
equipment.  It should define sets of criteria that DTRA and the RF can jointly use in contracting for 
systems. 
A secondary objective of this document is to identify any supplementary activities recommended to fully 
implement the evaluation criteria. 
This document outlines the appropriate and effective methodology and procedures for specifying and 
authenticating security targets for nuclear non-proliferation compliance monitoring equipment systems.  
As such, it considers all parties involved in the assessment and operation of the equipment: the developers 
of the technology, the assessors performing authentication analysis on the technology, and the users of the 
technology in the operational environment. 
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1.2 Terms and Definitions 
Authentication:  The process through which the Monitoring party gains appropriate assurance that the 
information reported by a measuring system accurately reflects the true state of the monitored 
item.  Thus, authentication focuses on the credibility of the result rather than the confidentiality of 
classified information. [Kouzes2001c] 
Authentication Assurance Level: One of a set of assurance packages (defined in this document) consisting 
of assurance components from [CC3] that represents a point on the [CC] assurance scale...that 
must be met to attain a given level of security assurance. 
Common Criteria:  Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, see [CC]. 
Common (Evaluation) Methodology:  Common Methodology for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation describes the minimum actions to be performed by an evaluator in order to conduct  
[CC] evaluation, see [CEM]. 
Evaluation Assurance Level:  From [CC1], a package consisting of assurance components from [CC3] 
that represents a point on the [CC] assurance scale (...that must be met to attain a given level of 
security assurance). 
Protection Profile:  From [CC1], an implementation-independent set of security requirements for a 
category of Targets of Evaluation (TOEs) that meet specific user needs.  It captures the required 
security functionality and security assurance requirements, along with the threats addressed and 
the environments in which the compliant product would apply. 
Security Critical Component: A software or hardware component essential to the security function of 
the equipment.  Any changes to a Security Critical Component must be evaluated to ensure that 
the security functionality of the system has not been compromised. 
Security Target:  From [CC1], a set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for 
the evaluation of an identified TOE. 
Target of Evaluation:  From [CC1], an IT product or system and its associated administrator and user 
guidance documentation that is the subject of  (security) evaluation. 
Vulnerability assessment:  From [CC3], the identification of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced due to 
the construction, operation, misuse, or incorrect configuration of the corresponding system or 
software. 
1.3 Acronyms 
AAL Authentication Assurance Level 
(see [CC]) 
 
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation 
 CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement 
r IT Security Evaluation (see [CEM]) CEM Common Methodology fo
COTS Commercial off the shelf 
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Ag ency 
 
tion 
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level 
ETR Evaluation Technical Report 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
ISMS Inventory Sampling Measurement System 
ISO International Organization for Standardiza
IT Information Technology 
OR Observation Report 
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PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
on 
SF TOE Security Functions 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Automated Measurement System at Mayak 
 
n of this fissile material into any future nuclear weapon program (Russian Federation or 
other country). 
ors, access controls, security alarms, and 
armed guards has primary responsibility for preventing theft.  
etail by the US. The US's 
uthentication process is not directly concerned with protecting classified information, but must respect 
legitimate system-access limitations required to protect classified information.  
 
PP Protection Profile 
ST Security Target 
TOA Target of Authenticati
TOE Target of Evaluation 
T
 
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is funding the construction of the Fissile Material 
Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak to facilitate Russian storage of thousands of canisters containing 
weapon-origin plutonium and possibly highly enriched uranium.  The US has funded the FMSF with the 
conditions that the facility will provide: 1) storage of weapons-origin material, 2) safe and secure storage
of this material, and 3) no re-use of this material for military purposes.  The non-proliferation goal is to 
prevent diversio
 
DTRA is funding the Russian Federation development of two measurement systems protected by an 
information-barrier (IB) for use at FMSF.  The Recording Device (RD) is proposed to observe each 
canister entering FMSF and provide confidence that each contains plutonium with isotopics consistent 
with weapon-grade plutonium.  The Inventory Sampling Measurement System (ISMS) is proposed to 
measure a statistical sampling of canisters from storage to provide confidence that each sampled canister 
is consistent with the declared mass of plutonium in metallic form with weapon-grade isotopics.  DTRA is 
also funding development of a facility monitoring system (FMS) that uses these two measurement 
systems to initialize item accountability along with other approaches (e.g., tags and seals, video 
surveillance, radiation sensors, records, and data processing) to maintain continuity of knowledge (CoK) 
regarding item accountability of canisters containing special nuclear material.  It is reasonable to assume 
that the FMS may include IB aspects because security measures are often considered classified and be 
subject to IB-related threats.  The large effort to develop these measurement and tracking capabilities 
implies a requirement for credibility regarding the results.  These three US-specified systems are largely 
intended to assure the US that the Russian operators of the facility are complying with the agreement.  A 
separate and independent Russian physical-protection system consisting of domestic safeguards, 
surveillance and tracking measures, Passport radiation sens
 
These IB-protected systems will make non-intrusive radiation measurements on sealed canisters to 
determine whether the contents are consistent with the Russian declarations. The Russian Federation 
considers the isotopic composition of the material to be classified and will conduct a separate certification 
process to protect the confidentiality of that information. The Russian Federation Host therefore is 
allowed to supply the IB-protected measurement systems to fully ensure that the Host's declared classified 
information is provided paramount protection during the measurements, analysis, and comparison with 
pre-agreed criteria.  Although the US never sees any classified data, the US must have confidence that 
displayed results accurately indicate satisfaction of all the pre-agreed criteria. The IB system design is 
assumed to be fully transparent, i.e. its operation is completely understood in d
a
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The RD has the most a priori vulnerabilities: daily operation by Russians, and total Russian control of the 
canister input stream.  However, the RD will be routinely independently validated by subsequent ISMS 
measurements on a statistical sampling of canisters. 
 
Authentication is the process through which the Monitoring party gains appropriate assurance that the 
information reported by a measuring system accurately reflects the true state of the monitored item.  Thus, 
authentication focuses on the credibility of the result rather than the confidentiality of classified 
information.  
 
2.2 Common Criteria 
 
This document uses the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation ("Common 
Criteria", or "CC"), (ISO/IEC 15408), as a tool for developing the authentication assurance evaluation 
criteria prescribed.  Although the CC addresses both functional requirements and assurance requirements, 
this document concentrates on the definition of assurance requirements.  
The CC is a catalog of criteria and a framework for organizing a subset of the criteria into security 
specifications. The CC is also a set of tools that allow for the construction of IT security requirements. 
The CC strictly addresses the functional and assurance requirements for IT security. Administrative 
measures not directly related to IT security are outside the scope of the CC. Using the CC as a standard 
permits independent evaluations to be compared. The CC does this by providing a “common” set of 
requirements for security properties of IT products and a “common” set of assurance measures that can be 
applied to those products during an evaluation. These requirements serve as guides for the development 
of IT products, the procurement of products with IT security features, and are a basis for evaluation of IT 
security products. 
2.3 CC Framework 
Figure 1 provides a high level view of the CC framework.  For our purposes the acronym TOE (Target of 
Evaluation) is the ISMS in its entirety (formally the CC defines the TOE as the security related part of the 
system undergoing evaluation).  Threats identified in the security environment lead to the development of 
security objectives, which are in turn satisfied by selecting appropriate security requirements from the 
catalogs in [CC2] (functional) and [CC3] (assurance). The developer of the system is responsible for 
implementing the requirements and presenting the system (TOE) for evaluation. The rationales (back 
pointing arrows) in Figure 1 indicate the tractability provided by the CC approach.  An unsatisfied 
requirement can be traced back to the threat(s) less mitigated.  A change in the security environment 
(change in threats, assumptions, or policies) can be traced forward to identify the security requirements 
that may require modification. 
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Figure 1: The Common Criteria Specification Framework 
 
2.4 Common Criteria Functional Requirements Catalog 
A catalog of functional security requirements criteria are available in [CC2] and are grouped in the 
following classes: 
Security Audit (FAU) 
Communication (FCO) 
Cryptographic Support (FCS) 
User Data Protection (FDP) 
Identification & Authentication (FIA) 
Security Management (FMT) 
Privacy (FPR)  
Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT) 
Resource Utilization (FRU) 
TOE Access (FTA) 
Trusted Path/Channels (FTP). 
 
Separately, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is defining the functional requirements for 
authentication of the ISMS. 
 
2.5 Common Criteria Assurance Requirements Catalog 
A catalog of assurance security requirements criteria are available in [CC3] and are grouped in the 
following classes: 
Configuration Management (ACM) 
Delivery and Operation (ADO) 
Development Documentation (ADV) 
Guidance Documents (AGD
port (ALC) 
) 
Life-Cycle Sup
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Testing (ATE) 
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) 
ssurance Maintenance (AMA) 
 re-authentication.  Thus, there are no ISMS assurance requirements in the Assurance Maintenance 
class. 
 
 
A
 
The eighth class, Assurance Maintenance, is often omitted from the list.  Traditionally, evaluators focused 
on qualifying a system for initial use and required significant re-assessment activities to validate a 
modified system.  This created a situation in which software validated under schemes predating the CC 
was rarely updated, making maintenance and modernization a nightmare. While the CC is addressing this 
issue, the effort generally lags the progress made in other areas.  While the maintenance of confidence in 
ISMS results is critically important to DTRA, it has been determined that modification to the system will 
require
Page 6  
Authentication Assurance Level Application to the Inventory Sampling Measurement System 
 
 
 
3 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 Assurance Requirements 
The focus of this document is to define the means by which the DTRA may gain confidence in the 
security properties of the ISMS equipment deployed to support nuclear non-proliferation compliance 
monitoring at the FMSF, Mayak. Various security assurance processes are required to provide confidence 
that the identified requirements adequately address and support the mission objectives of the ISMS, that 
the corresponding measures implemented in the equipment will meet the requirements, that the measures 
are implemented correctly and without flaw, that the equipment actually deployed contain the measures 
without alteration, that suitable on-going maintenance and other processes are in place to ensure the 
continued operation of the measures, and that classified information is not compromised at any time. 
 
3.2 Differentiating Security Functions from Assurances 
Any equipment will contain features in order to complete its specified purpose.  Part of those features will 
include protection mechanisms allowing the equipment to complete its purpose without compromise of 
the resources contained within.  The latter of these are termed ‘security functions’ of the equipment. In 
addition, the equipment has some inherent qualities that give the DTRA confidence that the features will 
perform as expected.  These are measured through processes that assess those qualities.  These are termed 
‘security assurances.’ 
It is sometimes difficult to differentiate between security features and assurances.  Generally, features are 
equipment behavior that can be detected, tested and evaluated by interacting with that equipment, usually 
via the defined interface. Assurances generally are the qualitative properties of equipment, known through 
investigation of functional or design evidence that provides a degree of confidence the equipment can 
perform its functions.  The mere existence of security functionality provides a certain level of confidence 
in the ability of the equipment to complete its mission.  This document defines a function as a feature that 
is exhibited by monitoring equipment, i.e., it is something that the equipment ‘does’.  An assurance is a 
method by which an assessor gains confidence that the equipment truly has those features. 
 
3.3 Assurance Combines Technical and Procedural Means 
DTRA needs to have confidence that the deployed ISMS protects the monitoring information from 
unauthorized disclosure, modification, or deletion and that the information is available whenever it is 
requested.  Similarly, the RF requires that the deployed ISMS protects the classified information from 
unauthorized disclosure. However, it is impossible to be absolutely sure that events that compromise 
security will not happen.  There will always remain a degree of risk that security incidents will occur, 
either because of unforeseen circumstances, an unexpected degree of attack, or exploitation of an 
acceptable risk based on cost, environment factors, or perceived threat. However, the DTRA will expect 
that nuclear materials be monitored to the extent possible through the combination of technical and 
procedural means, within cost considerations.  Each means will contribute to the overall goal of achieving 
a targeted level of confidence that the weapons origin material and monitoring information is not 
compromised. In the end the DTRA may need to accept some residual risk and must be prepared to take 
corrective action in case a security incident occurs. In order to effectively determine the amount of risk 
acceptable, the DTRA should conduct complete threat and risk analyses on the ISMS in order to make an 
informed decision on the types of equipment (and assurance in that equipment) to deploy.  
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Security incidents may occur either because of changing attacker incentives, an evolution in the 
technology available to the attacker, undetected (or known but accepted) flaws in the equipment 
becoming known to the attacker, or due to other unforeseen circumstances.  For these reasons, the 
ic manual examination of equipment by inspectors).  In order to gain the requisite 
hrough a combination of these procedural and technological means DTRA will protect nuclear non-
n in the ISMS to the extent feasible. 
 
sses assurances, that is, the verification and validation processes 
authentication of monitoring equipment should be an ongoing process.  It also means that it is just as 
important to know when a compromise has occurred as to prevent one from happening. 
Monitoring equipment cannot perform these functions without supporting procedures (e.g. physical 
access controls, period
level of confidence, the DTRA must ensure that these procedures are effective in supporting the security 
features of the ISMS. 
T
proliferation monitoring informatio
3.4  Framework 
Standardized approaches defined in the [CC] provide input to the various life cycle phases.  The 
requirements for security functions and assurances are developed early in the life cycle according to 
guidance that can be found in Part 1 of the standard, [CC1].  Part 2 [CC2], defines a menu of standard 
security functions that may be needed to meet security objectives (as discussed previously in subsection 
2.1.2, these functions may require supporting manual components and thus may impact the operational 
phase as well).  Part 3, [CC3], addre
required to ensure that the security solutions are properly implemented, meet user requirements, and are 
maintained throughout the life cycle. 
Functional requirements from [CC2] generally impact the design of the equipment and software.  
Assurance requirements from [CC3] impact the processes used to develop, test and evaluate, deploy and 
operate the equipment and software.  People perform these processes, and thus it is important to identify 
is used operationally.  Equipment 
evelopers, independent assessors, and operational users all play a role in maintaining the confidence that 
operly stored. 
the responsibility assignment for each requirement.  For example, some requirements of [CC3] must be 
met by the developer, others by the assessor, and still others by the DTRA itself. 
A balanced set of assurance measures is the best way for the DTRA to obtain the most cost-effective 
confidence in the ISMS.  This includes expectations of the developer of this equipment, the authentication 
assessments made on this equipment, and the maintenance of this confidence (‘continuity of knowledge’) 
once the initial authentication assessment is complete and ISMS 
d
weapons origin material is adequately protected and pr
 
3.5 Authentication Assessment Reporting 
The Common Evaluation Methodology document [CEM] has been issued as a companion to the Common 
Criteria as an agreed methodology for performing information security assessments according to the 
[CC].  As part of this methodology, it provides a general framework for technical reporting on these 
assessments.  The [CEM] identifies the use of specific reports to permit the consistent reporting of 
evaluation results.  The Observation Report (OR) is used to request clarifications (e.g. from the DTRA or 
the developer) or to identify a problem with an aspect of the evaluation.  Observation Reports are always 
produced for products failing their assessment.  The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) is used to 
document the technical justification for the assessment verdict.  The [CEM] defines minimum content for 
these reports, and this definition can be augmented by the DTRA to add any missing DTRA-specific 
required content. In general, the [CEM] requires that an assessor enumerate the activities undertaken to 
gain the requisite confidence in the equipment being assessed. These are directly derived from the 
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assurance requirements as defined by [CC3]. The assessor then provides a pass/fail verdict on whether the 
equipment meets each requirement and provides a justification as to why that verdict was reached.  PNNL 
proposes to model their authentication reporting on this process. 
here may be instances in which reporting how a flaw was discovered would disclose information about 
sensitive.  In these cases, the flaw may be reported without 
discussing the methods used to detect it. 
ical content and quality of security assessments of the 
the extent necessary to meet US needs. 
other 
easures. 
  were used in the authentication assessment to be used as standards to 
facilitate the identification of any changes in hardware delivered for operational use. 
 
3.6.2
The f
2. roper development methods, 
ently 
4. 
5. nt to maintain and support the assurance of the 
 
 
6. The developer must notify the DTRA of any changes made to the ISMS during its life cycle.  If 
urity critical components that have been identified by the developer 
or the authentication assessors (the entire system), they must notify the DTRA and support any 
uthentication experts who follow a 
T
an evaluator’s capabilities that are considered 
 
3.6 Key Roles and Responsibilities 
3.6.1 DTRA Oversight 
DTRA has the role to define and oversee the techn
security of IT monitoring equipment and software.  They define the policies and technical criteria by 
which the ISMS will be judged, and assure that the assessments are performed in a technically sound 
manner, to 
DTRA has the authority to judge whether or not an identified flaw is serious enough to make the 
equipment unsuitable for monitoring use or if it can be successfully overcome by operational or 
m
DTRA also retains the units that
 Equipment Developers 
ollowing are general developer requirements for ISMS: 
1. The  developer must receive sufficiently clear requirements for ISMS functionality, 
The developer should follow p
3. The developer should provide the level of documentation needed to effectively and effici
assess the vulnerabilities of ISMS,  
The developer should ensure that sufficient information is provided with the equipment so that 
ISMS can be used correctly, 
The developer should make a commitme
equipment over a reasonable life cycle for the equipment. This commitment should be supported
through the provisioning of spares and simultaneous random selection by DTRA inspectors from
spares of replacement parts and re-authentication targets.  Any other modification to ISMS will 
require complete re-authentication, and 
the changes involve any sec
assessment that the DTRA deems necessary. 
 
3.6.2 Authentication Assessors 
The DTRA will receive an authentication assessment on ISMS from a
general set of assessment criteria prepared for DTRA.  These assessments will be based on the [CC] and 
[CEM] in order to ensure measurable results and a reusable process. The assessors will take into account 
the presumed threats, DTRA policies, and agreed assumptions about the threat environment.  This 
combination determines the strength that the ISMS must demonstrate. 
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The assessment team is comprised of experts knowledgeable in the technology, the assessment criteria, 
and the general needs of the DTRA. To ensure an unbiased result, these assessors are independent from 
the specification of and development of the ISMS.  While this generally requires that the assessment team 
be uninvolved in the design and development of the technology being assessed, in the case of the ISMS 
requested to be involved in review of design and development progress to 
with development methodology and quality of deliverables (e.g., design 
nt.  The equipment is operated in an environment not entirely under the control 
of DTRA.  There are varying degrees of insider threats to be considered.  
However, all operational users need clear instructions on the use of the equipment, and in maintaining a 
ecurity environment for the equipment.  Ensuring that these instructions are followed is a DTRA 
h ity.  
yak facility for approximately two-weeks per visit.  Only 
uring their visits is the ISMS operated. Current plans call for the ISMS and the room in which it is 
located to be tagged and sealed by these inspectors at the conclusion of each visit. This plan may change 
to allow shared access to the ISMS room.  Various re-authentication procedures are being developed to 
ensure that the ISMS remains uncompromised. 
 
the authentication team has 
detect early any problems 
documentation, source code complexity, configuration management practices). The authentication 
assessors should be from a different organization than any involved in the development. 
3.6.3 Operational Users 
The ISMS operational environment must be understood, in realistic terms, including the degree of 
hostility in the environme
s
oversig t responsibil
The operational users are a major source of the environment and threat for the ISMS. 
 
3.6.4 Inspectors 
DTRA inspectors will periodically visit the Ma
d
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4 ASSURANCE MEASURES 
4.1 Standardized Approach 
The ISO/IEC 15408, Common Criteria, [CC] was developed as a collaborative effort among those nations 
producing information technology (IT) security certificates.  The [CC] was accepted as an international 
standard in 1999 and is used worldwide as the means for specifying and measuring the security attributes 
of IT equipment and software. 
In addition, the [CC] is further supported by a recognition arrangement among fourteen nations.  This 
arrangement provides a means to assure that each of the certificate-producing schemes produces 
technically correct and complete evaluations, and that they report those findings in a consistent manner.  
Such international acceptance provides DTRA with confidence that the CC methodology is up-to-date 
and widely accepted. 
The Common Criteria is adopted by the US and an effort is underway in the Russian Federation to adopt 
it.  Although Belarus has also been active in the CC community, there are no members of the FSU other 
than Russia known to be actively pursuing adoption of the CC at this time. 
 
4.2 Assurance Package Concept 
This document uses the [CC] central concept of ‘assurance packages’ to define the degree of confidence 
required of monitoring equipment and the assurance measures that provide the required level of 
confidence.  The [CC] provides seven example evaluation assurance levels (EALs), as well as a set of 
composition rules for refining those packages to meet the needs of the user.  These rules include a means 
to provide assurance measures beyond those defined in the [CC] so that users such as DTRA may provide 
the specific additional measures necessary for the protection of monitoring materials and information.  
Therefore, the EALs are used as the starting point for authentication assessments that are defined here for 
application to DTRA needs, but additional measures are used to supplement their application. In addition, 
the [CC] terminology has been refined, where appropriate, to relate it to the DTRA environment. 
 
4.3 Role of Assurance Measures 
The [CC] provides a set of assurance requirements for use in defining the authentication assessment needs 
of DTRA.  The following section explores the classes of assurance requirements as defined in the [CC] 
 requirements must be in place during 
bserved) operations and which can be verified via inspections. 
 that 
ent. 
Because of this, the ISMS should meet the following configuration management requirements: 
and relates them to the general DTRA requirements. 
The requirements below are separated into what is required of the developer-produced materials, what is 
required of the assessor-produced materials, and what ongoing
(o
 
4.4 Control over the configuration of the equipment 
It is important that ISMS be identifiable as the version that matches the design that was meant to meet the 
functional requirements.  The existence of a strong configuration management system ensures
unknown, unauthorized additions and changes were not made in the development of the equipm
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Developer Requirements 
4.4.1 The equipment should be easily, and uniquely identifiable 
4.4.2 All relevant equipment-related documentation should be covered by a configuration management 
plan and be part of a configuration management system. 
4.4.3 A list of configuration items should be maintained.  
4.4.4 It should be clear that a developer is following the plan and that the plan is adequate to ensure 
that the equipment is in fact the right one(s). 
 
In addition, the effort to produce and maintain evidence about the security of the equipment should also 
be maintained under configuration management. 
4.4.5 Each piece of evidence should be clearly identifiable and clearly denote the version of the 
equipment being assessed. 
4.4.6 It should be clear that only authorized changes to the evidence were made and that the final 
version of the evidence represents the equipment being assessed. 
 
In future, for more critical and more robust monitoring systems, the configuration management system 
should have automated support to help ensure that the rules and controls for changes to the equipment are 
enforced.  
 
Assessor Requirements 
It is also important that the assessor manage the production of their report(s), and any actions agreed in 
the course of the assessment. In the end, the assessor must ensure that their report reflects the state of the 
equipment in question. 
4.4.7 The assessor should use a configuration management system to manage changes to the 
assessment report. 
4.4.8 The assessor’s configuration management system should assure that any agreed activities and 
decisions made in the course of the evaluation and the production of any reports on the security 
state of the equipment in question are correctly reflected in the report. 
 
Ongoing Operational Requirements 
In addition, inspections need to verify that correct versions of the equipment continue to be used.  This 
may be performed through functions within the equipment or through a series of procedures that an 
inspector may take to ascertain the version being used. 
4.4.9 or should be provided a means to determine the configuration of the equipment during 
operation. 
4.5 Confidence the Equipment was the One Shipped and it is Installed Correctly 
ampered with and can easily 
be brought into the secure configuration agreed for the environment at hand. 
Developer Requirements 
4.5.1 uipment received is truly from the developer and 
The inspect
 
 
It is important that DTRA be sure that any equipment delivered has not been t
DTRA should have a means to ensure that eq
that it has not been tampered with en route.  
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4.5.2 ISMS should be pre-installed with the appropriate secure configuration or should include 
adequate information for the site to properly install this configuration, and to know that the 
equipment is in a suitable state for use according to agreed policies. 
.5.3 The developer should provide information as to what assessment evidence (documentation, 
sou n it will be delivered.  Each piece of 
evidence must be clearly identified. 
lessen this cost, the ISMS 
uthenticators have recommended that the design and code not be complex, that the operating system in 
ate in design reviews for early 
detection of problems with the quality and thoroughness of design and code. 
ign documentation made available to the assessors, the more understanding they may gain in 
the inne o
assessment 
information
1) ls on how a user accesses the equipment through 
i
 of the 
a
2) 
3) into modules with 
and dependencies among modules.  It 
plete picture as to the inner workings of the equipment. 
of the design of the 
 opment practices.  
The ass  
equipme
es 
scription should be to the 
 
.6.1.3 The developer should provide the authentication team with a description of the structure of the 
ISMS, including how the information barrier functions are provided.  
4
rce code, complete ISMS, etc) will be delivered and whe
 
4.6 Confidence Through the Process of Development 
A contention in assessment has always been the availability of internal development design information 
and source code.  This information is necessary for assessors to completely analyze the equipment and 
any flaws within the equipment. The analysis of this information is often very costly, as the assessors 
need to spend time understanding the internals of the equipment.  To 
a
ISMS have a very small footprint, and that the authentication team particip
 
4.6.1 Availability of Design Documentation for Inspection Purposes 
The more des
r-w rkings of the equipment, allowing them to have a more thorough testing and vulnerability 
approach.  Often the design is broken into three levels of abstraction, each providing more 
. 
The functional specification provides detai
nterfaces, either direct user interfaces (commands, buttons, etc.) or programming interfaces 
(system interfaces).  This specification will be available from the developer as part
greed contract for development of ISMS.  
The high-level design provides more information on how the equipment is structured and 
how the different portions work together.  This is often called the system architecture. 
The detailed design organizes the internal workings of the equipment 
interrelationships.  This detailed statement of the equipment design provides a complete look 
at the behavior of the internal and external interfaces 
provides a com
Design information allows the assessors the ability to gain enough understanding 
quipment to thoroughly test it and assess potential security flaws. e
Developer Requirements 
4.6.1.1 The ISMS developer should follow good and sound devel
 
essor will determine that the development practices are suitable by reviewing the design of the
nt to ensure that it reflects the purpose of the equipment. 
4.6.1.2 The developer should provide the authentication team with a description of the external interfac
to the ISMS, including the purpose and method of use of each.  This de
level of detail such that the user may use the defined interfaces to integrate the equipment into an
overall system.  
4
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4.6.1.4 The developer should provide the authentication team w ith a description of internal workings of 
the equipment, including the interrelationships among the modules comprising the equipment.  
 substantial.  Because of this, the authentication 
de and extrapolate that the rest has the same quality as the sample.  
They will minimally look at especially critical portions of the source code as defined by analysis of 
tical enough to 
warrant the extra work of looking at the lowest level abstraction of the design. 
.6.2.2 The developer should provide the ‘source code’ of the entire system. 
 e design expected.  
 
either from internal or 
ll 
take the subsidy.  However, DTRA should require that the 
MS developer change their development process so as to limit code complexity. 
ues to ensure that the details on 
of abstraction meets the higher one and should also perform a sanity check that (at least 
y is 
to ensure that deviations in the design have not resulted in equipment that does not meet its original 
quirement set.  
4.6.3.3 The assessor should determine that the final implementation corresponds to the original set of 
 
4.6.2 Confidence Gained by Inspecting the Source Code  
The source code generates the executable code for the equipment.  The term ‘source code’ here is used 
loosely as it may contain hardware, software and/or firmware.  The source is central to assessing the 
vulnerabilities of a piece of equipment and to see the actual implementation of the design.  
The resources required to analyze the source code can be
team may look at a subset of the co
detailed design and comparison to the source code tree.  
For the ISMS the following apply.  
Developer Requirements 
4.6.2.1 The authentication team should determine which portions of the equipment are cri
4
4.6.2.3 The assessor should determine that the source code reflects th
 
4.6.3 Confidence Gained Through Limiting Code Complexity 
One way to minimize errors in the implementation is to design it such that each module is small and is 
minimal in complexity.  An assessor can then more easily gain an understanding of the system 
implementation and can more easily find flaws in that implementation.  These requirements cause a 
developer to design and implement in a specific manner and must be done from the onset of the 
development. Few developers meet these types of requirements with reused code, 
external sources.  Therefore, these requirements are expensive to implement and developers rarely wi
se requirements on board without substantial 
IS
4.6.3.1 The ISMS developer should use structured development techniq
the design can be well understood. 
 
4.6.3.2 Confidence That All Levels of Abstraction Meet Requirements 
It is not uncommon that, as a design is refined, decisions cause variances so that in the end the final 
implementation does not meet the initial intent.  To avoid this, a developer should always check to see 
that a lower level 
the lowest) level of abstraction still meets the initial requirements.  The important result of this activit
re
requirements for that equipment. 
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4.6.3.4 Provision of an Overall Equipment Security Policy Model 
In addition, a long list of functional requirements (or functions) often does not convey the whole p
of what protection given equipment is attempting to accomplish.  To aid in this it is useful to gather a
 information into a written statement of th
icture 
ll the 
ecurity e security policy for the equipment as a whole.  This is 
alled the security policy model.  There may be times when an informal description of the equipment 
y curity objectives of the equipment.  However, 
 nt so is not always necessary.  
It is imperative that users of the equipment know how to use the equipment securely. In addition, those 
form 
those du als that 
ent.  
These s
4.6.4.1 er should provide (to both DTRA (including the authentication team) and to the 
operational users) all information necessary to operate the equipment in a secure manner. 
 should be written in a way that it is easy to understand and 
equipme ts of maintaining the ISMS.  DTRA will largely define 
is information, although portions may be provided by the developer or developed through separate 
rangements.  
 
.6.4.4 DTRA should supplement developer operational documentation with DTRA-specific information 
on the secure operation of the equipment. 
Inspector Requirements 
nt of determining that the equipment is the 
version it is thought to be, there are other measures that can be taken to better ensure the integrity of the 
s
c
securit  policies will be helpful in understanding the se
usually this will be self-evident with many of the equipme
4.6.3.5 The developer should provide a succinct statement of the security policies supported by the 
equipment, in a natural language format. 
 
 
4.6.4 Documentation Delivered with the Equipment 
assigned administrative duties over keeping the equipment operational also must know how to per
ties.  Both operational and administrative users must be provided with clear usage manu
both explain what they must do and sufficient information to understand the security in their environm
hould be consistent with, and directly linked to, the agreed ISMS policies.  
Developer Requirements 
The develop
4.6.4.2 The developer should provide (to both DTRA (including the authentication team) and to the 
operational sites) all information necessary to configure and maintain the equipment in a secure 
manner.  
4.6.4.3 All operational documentation
implement. 
 
In addition, the operational sites must be provided documents on maintaining the environment of the 
nt, including physical and personnel aspec
th
contractual and policy ar
DTRA Requirements 
4
 
4.6.4.5 The inspectors should ensure that the ISMS is configured in a secure manner during ongoing 
operations. 
 
 
4.6.5 Assurance Gained Throughout the Product Life Cycle 
Although configuration management is an important compone
equipment over its lifecycle. The developer should use well-defined tools (such as compilers) that do not 
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introduce security problems in their use.  The verification of these tools is not always possible, but if they 
onable for 
velopment 
uire that the developer 
 order to ensure that no surreptitious entries are made into the equipment implementation, the developer 
 h rity measures to control access to the implementation.  
e methods are followed at all times.  
uld use well-defined tools and techniques in the development of the equipment. 
e and negative testing to ensure that, while using those functions, the security of the 
 clear plan for ensuring component, integration and system testing of the 
equipment.  These tests should be documented and repeatable so that the same test produces the same 
4.6.6.1 The developer should have a clear test plan to ensure that all portions of the ISMS are tested.  
ing of the ISMS, taking into consideration the tests that the 
 
 
e 
he assessors should use the developer tests as a starting point to their testing, supplementing them as 
equipment, this testing should be comprehensive, covering all the 
ipment.  
 ar test plan to ensure that all portions of the equipment are tested.  
4.6.6.4 The assessor should test the equipment interfaces to ensure that they behave correctly. 
are at least understood, the risk of them introducing vulnerabilities is minimized. It is reas
DTRA to require that the ISMS developer have the means to protect the materials during the de
and production of the equipment.  However, it is not reasonable for DTRA to req
prove that the tools used in the development be without fault.  
In
should ave secu
Developer Requirements 
4.6.5.1 The developer should employ methods for protecting the integrity of the ISMS during 
development and production.  
4.6.5.2 The developer should ensure that thes
4.6.5.3 The developer sho
 
4.6.6 Testing 
Both the developers and the authenticators need to test the equipment to ensure that it works as expected.  
There are two types of testing: positive testing to ensure that the equipment provides the functions that it 
claims to provid
equipment is not compromised in some way. 
Developer Requirements 
The developer should have a
results (with some variance based on system variables).  The testing should demonstrate that the 
equipment design (as documented) is reflected in the actual implementation this provides confidence that 
design decisions have not introduced any faults or vulnerabilities in the equipment.  These tests are called 
functional tests. 
4.6.6.2 The developer should thoroughly test all the interfaces to ensure that they behave correctly.  
 
Authenticator Requirements 
Authenticators should also perform test
developer performed.  They will use the knowledge gained from looking at the development
ting.  Theydocumentation to create their own plan and tests, performing both positive and negative tes
should also have a clear plan for testing the equipment, both for functionality and for vulnerabilities in th
equipment.  
T
necessary.  For critical monitoring 
interfaces and execution paths.  However, the assessor should consider the diminishing returns in this 
comprehensive testing.  At one point more testing will only provide negligible additional confidence in 
the security functions of the equ
4.6.6.3 The assessor should have a cle
4.6.6.5 The assessor should test the equipment to determine if there are ways to circumvent the security 
of the equipment.  
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Ongoing Operational Requirements 
DTRA should provide a test suite to the inspectors in order for them to determine that the ISMS is in a 
secure state while in operation. 
 
4.6.7 Authentication of the ISMS 
The authenticators will use all the knowledge gained through the other assurance measures to determine 
 whether the 
t 
The aut veloper should show that 
ey have considered the applicable vulnerabilities that their equipment could contain and how they have 
sses have been minimized.  If the developer has not done this, the authenticator 
in the 
ISMS w .  
 
4.6.7.2 
 
ssessor Requirements 
.6.7.3 The authenticator should analyze all information provided on the equipment to determine if 
pot
4.6.7.4 The authenticator should produce a thorough and systematic plan for determining residual flaws 
is should also include enough information for 
 of the flaws and whether other measures can be taken to 
 
 
4.7 Levels 
The gen l been translated into a set of assurance packages, 
s outlin  in the [CC].  The [CC] has seven predefined assurance packages, known as Evaluation 
nd reviewed 
• EAL5 - semiformally designed and tested 
• EAL6 - semiformally verified design and tested 
what, if any, flaws ISMS will have in its operating environment.  They will determine
functions provided are strong enough to meet the threats and whether there are ways that the equipmen
can be misused to compromise the information stored and transmitted.  
henticators should enlist the developers in this search for flaws.  The de
th
ensured that the weakne
will need to spend much more time analyzing these possibilities. However, the analysis of any flaw 
ill remain primarily the task of the authentication team
Developer Requirements 
4.6.7.1 The developer should take vulnerability information into account in the design and 
implementation of the ISMS, making design choices to minimize the number of vulnerabilities. 
The developer should be able to demonstrate the method by which they countered the possible 
vulnerabilities in the ISMS. (This may be unrealistic but it is desirable.) 
A
4
ential flaws exist in the operational environment. 
in the equipment.  
4.6.7.5 The assessor should investigate (through testing or analysis) to see if such flaws exist. 
4.6.7.6 The assessor should fully document all the results of the analysis and testing as to which flaws 
exist, and the conditions under which they exist.  Th
DTRA to determine the severity
satisfactorily mitigate them. 
Establishing Authentication Assurance 
era  assurance requirements outlined above has 
eda
Assurance Levels (EALs).  These provide balanced groupings of assurance components that are intended 
to be generally applicable.  The seven EALs are as follows: 
• EAL1 - functionally tested 
• EAL2 - structurally tested 
• EAL3 - methodically tested and checked 
• EAL4 - methodically designed, tested a
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• EAL7 - formally verified design and tested 
 
These EALs are used as a set of baselines in the assessment of general information technology by national 
aintained during the operations of the equipment, by 
ot discussed by the [CC]. 
PNNL has developed five assurance packages for use in authenticating monitoring equipment.  These are 
evaluation and certification schemes for inclusion on Evaluated Products Lists (EPLs) as an aid in 
purchasing these technologies for inclusion in operational systems.  Most commercial evaluations target 
somewhere between EAL3 and EAL4 as an assurance package.  However, these are used only as 
baselines and many assessments of commercial products include additional assurance measures to these 
levels: these are usually termed ‘EAL augmented.’ 
Although a good basis for DTRA authentication campaigns, the EALs only provide assurance through the 
development of equipment; assurance gained and m
those performing the operations, is n
termed Authentication Assurance Levels (AALs).  The application of these AALs is largely a DTRA 
management decision, but should be based on a reasonable and appropriate combination of threat to the 
equipment in the monitoring environment and budgetary considerations. PNNL proposes AAL3 as an 
appropriate target for the ISMS. Given that CC acceptance and knowledge in the RF is limited at this 
time, it is difficult to communicate in a timely and effective manner to the developer the higher 
requirements of AAL4. 
4.7.1 AAL0 - Unauthenticated 
AAL0 is applicable where no confidence in the correct operation can be expected due to the lack of 
nticating authority to participate in system design review, or to witness a comprehensive test of 
the system. 
 any equipment used in monitoring regimes should have. An 
t vidence that the Target of Authentication (TOA) functions in 
on, and that it provides useful protection against identified 
threats. Co-operation of the developer is required in terms of the delivery of design information and test 
ecurity in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. The developer 
conducts functional and high-level design testing, and independent testing is conducted to ensure only 
se circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of 
independently assured security and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs. 
AAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test 
results.  
assurance measures taken by the developer or authenticating authority. This AAL is used where, although 
some assurance measures might have been used, none are sufficient to provide any measure of confidence 
in system operations. For example, the developer does not develop, provide, or maintain any of the 
documentation on system design, development, and operations, nor does the developer allow members of 
the authe
4.7.2 AAL1 - Minimally Authenticated   
AAL1 is the minimum level of assurance that
authen ication at this level should provide e
a manner consistent with its documentati
results. 
AAL1 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low level of independently 
assured s
that security functions perform as specified.  
4.7.3 AAL2 - Limited Authentication  
AAL2 is applicable in tho
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AAL2 requires additional components from each of the Security Assurance Requirement classes except 
guidance documents. Authentication analysis is supported by the low-level design of the modules of the 
velopment, and a requirement for a rigorous development approach without incurring 
le costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques. AAL3 is the recommended 
TOA, covert channel analysis and a subset of implementation of the TOA Security Functions. 
Development controls are supported by a life-cycle model, identification of tools, and partially automated 
configuration management. 
4.7.4 AAL3 - Critical Authentication 
This AAL is applicable where there is a need for higher level of independently assured security in a 
planned de
unreasonab
lowest assurance level that any equipment used in monitoring regimes should have. 
AAL4 provides complete automation of configuration management, prevention of modification and 
ompliance with implementation standards. Semi-formal responses from the developer are required for 
OA security policy model. The 
dependent vulnerability assessments must ensure the system’s resistance to attackers.  The developer 
ust conduct a systematic search for covert channels, and test the low-level design. Development 
onmen her strengthened. 
IZE AUTHENTICATION COSTS 
ration of security functional and assurance requirements early in the product life cycle will lead 
nts into project planning will ensure that the measures and 
AAL3 requires that the system be highly resistant to exploitation.  A developer designed lifecycle model, 
the tracking of security flaws, and independent testing of a selected sample of developer tests enhances 
assurance. 
4.7.5 AAL4 - Optimal Authentication 
AAL4 is the maximum level of assurance economically possible for equipment used in monitoring 
regimes.  It is applicable where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.  AAL4 
permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a 
rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOA for protecting high value assets 
against significant risks.   
c
functional specifications, high-level design documentation and the T
in
m
envir t and configuration management controls are furt
 
5 STRATEGIES TO MINIM
 
5.1 Early Integration of Security Requirements 
The integ
to overall lower life cycle costs. 
The early identification of functional security requirements will permit system designers to more fully 
understand user needs and will allow trade-off studies to be developed which address overall life cycle 
costs, including assessment costs, and which consider the full range of hardware, software and manual 
options. 
The early integration of assurance requireme
deliverables needed are fully identified up-front to all parties, and will ensure that unexpected 
requirements, costs or project delays do not arise later in the project.  Early involvement of the assessors 
in the design process (e.g. by performing concurrent assessment) can provide the developer with early 
feedback on the attainment of the functional requirements and compliance with the assurance 
Page 19  
Authentication Assurance Level Application to the Inventory Sampling Measurement System 
 
 
requirements.  (However, care should be taken in order that the assessors maintain sufficient 
independence from the actual development.) 
, system designers can more fully understand user 
eeds and examine options that span the full range of hardware, software and manual procedures.  
e cycle costs, including development and assessment 
costs, and develop trade-off studies between the options available.  PNNL recommends release to the 
ecause the ISMS is being developed for DTRA under contract, it is recommended the authentication 
 participate in proposal review and design reviews. The objective is to improve the authenticatability 
of the final product by identifying quality issues in the various levels of abstraction (e.g., proposed 
Where a particular solution can be constructed using commercial off the shelf (COTS) components, it 
may be feasible to reduce overall authentication costs to the extent COTS products may be reasonably 
trusted.  For example, it may not be necessary to examine the source code for a COTS operating system 
from a non-Russian developer. For such components, it should be sufficient to verify by a bit compare 
process that the operational component is identical to the commercially available product (purchased 
under a blind buy). 
The identification and publication of the Protection Profile (PP) will provide essential input to the 
developer.  These documents will identify the security functions which must be included in the product to 
be developed and will define to the developer the level of rigor which must be applied to the development 
process and corresponding documentation.  PNNL is separately developing a protection profile based on 
the ISMS functional requirements. 
With the early identification of functional requirements
n
Options can be analysed which identify overall lif
ISMS developer of DTRA’s functional and assurance security requirements, so that the developer can 
better understand and comply with these requirements. 
 
5.2 Early Input to Functional Design 
B
team
functional design, high-level design, detailed design) of the ISMS as early as possible in the development 
process. Early detected problems can be affordably corrected. 
 
5.3 Role of COTS Components 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following issues are recommended for further study. 
 
6.1 Define Security Policies and Procedures 
DTRA should provide a written set of security policies and procedures so the authenticators can assure 
that the equipment can meet those policies, and operate under the procedures.  Existing policies and 
procedures should be reviewed and revised as necessary.  This review is an ongoing task as the threat 
environments are likely to evolve over time.  In addition, these policies and procedures should include 
how and when they are applied, and the circumstances under which they may be waived. 
 
6.2 Define Security Functional Requirements 
Assurance measures alone are not sufficient for ensuring the protection of monitoring information.  In 
fact, they are meaningless without a set of security functional requirements against which to assess 
equipment.  DTRA should produce a set of complete IT security requirements in the form of “Protection 
Profiles” and release them to authenticators to ensure that the authenticator can verify that the functional 
requirements have been correctly implemented, and to developers, to ensure that they have a clear 
statement of the security functional requirements for an equipment that can meet DTRA needs. 
 
6.3 Define Acceptable Approach(es) to Meet Assurance Requirements 
There are numerous ways in which a developer might well meet some of the assurance requirements such 
as configuration management or development method. DTRA should define, by way of  “examples”, the 
approach(es) that are acceptable, which may be based on experience with previous equipment. 
 
6.4 Authentication Reports 
DTRA should develop a clear guidance document on the format, structure and content of assessment (as 
well as inspection) reports.  [CEM] is an excellent source for this purpose. 
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A ANNEX:  COMMON CRITERIA ASSURANCE PACKAGES 
A.1 Introduction 
Table A-1 provides a general view of the five proposed AALs for DTRA equipment.  A description of the 
specific activities follows for AAL3 (recommended for ISMS), using the standard language of the CC.  
Application notes to aid in the specific application of the assurance measures for DTRA purposes are also 
provided. 
The requirement statements in the specific activities sections below use the CC terminology. This means 
that the requirements are divided into three sections: requirements for evidence on the equipment, the 
contents of that evidence (or the information that the authenticator needs to glean from the evidence), and 
the action that the authenticator will take to confirm that the evidence is adequate. For the last of these, 
there is a generic statement that the ‘Evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all 
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.’  This simply means that the authenticator 
confirms that the developer has met all their requirements.  
Because the requirement statements use the CC terminology, a simple mapping of this terminology to 
DTRA terminology can be made.  Therefore, for all these requirements the following use of terminology 
can be assumed: 
• The term ‘TOE’ can be read as ‘monitoring equipment’. 
• The term ‘TSF’ can be read as the ‘security functions in the monitoring equipment’. 
• The term ‘evaluator’ can be read as ‘DTRA authenticator’. 
• The term ‘developer’ can be read as ‘equipment developer or agent employed to develop 
evidence’. 
 
A.2 Conventions in the DTRA Authentication Assurance Levels 
Table 1 provides a summary overview of the types of assurance measures applicable at each of the EALs 
defined in the [CC] and for AAL3 for DTRA use (the remaining AALs will be completed in detail in the 
future). It provides an overview for the purposes of comparison.  The reader should reference the [CC] for 
further explanation of the labeling conventions used.  The contents of the requirements are expanded in 
the sections that follow Table 1.  With those expanded requirements are references to the source of the 
[CC] requirements for comparison purposes.  Note that these are references to the first occurrence of the 
requirements with a [CC] family and requirements are not repeated within a given table of requirements.  
For those instances where the [CC] is extended or expanded, a naming convention of ‘EXP’ is appended 
to the element reference. (The [CC] calls these ‘explicitly stated requirements’).  
An asterisk (*) is included with the number when further explanation is provided for use within DTRA 
developments.  These further expansions of the assurance measures are provided in the ‘Application 
Notes’ sections that follow.  These may not always be applicable when DTRA is choosing a COTS piece 
of monitoring equipment.  However, they can be applied in developments and authentication regimes 
under the control of DTRA. 
 
It is important to note that all information on the application of the [CC] cannot be replicated here. The 
DTRA, assessors and developers should refer to the [CC] and the [CEM] to gain more information. In 
addition, they should monitor the process of interpreting the standard on the [CC] project website 
http://www/commoncriteria.org.  
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Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level 
EAL (from CC) Authentication Assurance 
Level (AAL) 
Assurance 
Class 
Assurance 
Family 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 
ACM_AUT    1 1 2 2    1  
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5    4  Configuration management 
ACM_SCP   1 2 3 3 3    2  
ADO_DEL  1 1 2 2 2 3    2  Delivery and 
operation ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    1  
ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4    2*  
ADV_HLD  1 2 2 3 4 5    2*  
ADV_IMP    1 2 3 3    1*  
ADV_INT     1 2 3      
ADV_LLD    1 1 2 2    1*  
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3    1  
Development 
ADV_SPM    1 3 3 3    1*  
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    1  Guidance 
documents AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1    1  
ALC_DVS   1 1 1 2 2    1  
ALC_FLR             
ALC_LCD    1 2 2 3    1*  
Life cycle 
support 
ALC_TAT    1 2 3 3    1  
ATE_COV  1 2 2 2 3 3    2  
ATE_DPT   1 1 2 2 3    1*  
ATE_FUN  1 1 1 1 2 2    1*  
Tests 
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3    2*  
AVA_CCA     1 2 2    1*  
AVA_MSU   1 2 2 3 3    1  
AVA_SOF  1 1 1 1 1 1    1  
Vulnerability 
assessment 
AVA_VLA  1 1 2 3 4 4    4*  
AMA_AMP             
AMA_CAT             
AMA_EVD             
Assurance 
Maintenance 
AMA_SIA             
*  Includes elements refined or added to meet specific DTRA needs. 
Table 1:  Summary of CC and ISMS Authentication Assurance Levels 
 
 
A.3 Control over the Configuration of the Equipment Objectives 
By controlling the configuration definition and changes during development, it can be assured that the 
resulting equipment reflects the design requirements and is tested to those requirements. This is 
accomplished through a combination of an agreed scope over what items should be under change control, 
the rigor of the configuration management control system, and the degree of automated support to that 
process.  
 
Page 25  
Authentication Assurance Level Application to the Inventory Sampling Measurement System 
 
 
A.3.1 Application Notes 
A.3.1.1 Scope of the Configuration Management System 
The [CC] (in ACM_SCP.1) requires the following as the required configuration items under configuration 
control: TOE implementation representation, design documentation, test documentation, user 
documentation, administrator documentation and CM documentation. The coverage of other 
documentation, such as the vulnerability analysis documentation, is not explicitly covered. Although this 
may be acceptable, in the DTRA context, for generally applicable commercially available equipment, the 
list of those items covered by the configuration management system may be negotiated with the developer 
for specialty monitoring equipment.  In particular, this list may not be applicable to all equipment or it 
may not be cost effective to place all items under control.  
The entire list of configuration items required in the [CC] may not be applicable to all monitoring 
equipment and may therefore be a matter of negotiation in the initial contract with the developer. 
However, it is imperative that the complete list be fully defined to ensure that the developer knows what 
needs to be covered by the configuration management system.  
In addition, the developer may choose to control changes to some configuration items via different 
systems. In this instance, the methods would be differentiated in the configuration management 
documentation and the configuration items covered by each method would be identified.  
 
A.3.1.2 Identification of the equipment (TOE) version 
The CC requires that a reference be provided for the TOE so the consumer can identify when they have 
the evaluated version of that TOE. It is also important that all relevant documentation also carry that same 
reference so that the assessor, and DTRA as the consumer; can match the documentation with the 
evaluated version of the equipment being used in monitoring.  
 
A.3.1.3 Evaluator confirmation of configuration management system 
The CC requires that the assessor verify that the configuration management system is being effectively 
used and that it is adequately documented. DTRA may choose to enforce this requirement through 
contractual means or require the assessor to confirm the configuration management system via alternate, 
less rigorous means.  In addition, the information required in the documentation may be obtained through 
a combination of written and verbal communications so the rigor of the documentation requirements may 
also be lessened. 
 
Control over equipment configuration & changes during development  AAL3 
Developer Action Elements: 
The developer shall provide a reference [AC for the TOE.  M_CAP.1.4D] X 
The developer shall use a CM system. [ACM_CAP.2.2D] X 
The developer shall provide CM documentation.[ACM_AUT.1.2D, ACM_CAP.2.3D, 
ACM_SCP.1.1D] 
X 
ontent and presentation of evidence elements: 
M documentation shall show that the CM system, as a minimum, tracks t
following configuration items [assignment: list of configuration items]. 
[ACM_SCP.1.1C EXP1] 
X 
C
The C he 
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Control over equipment configuration & changes during development  AAL3 
The CM documentation shall describe how configuration items are tracked by the CM 
system. [ACM_SCP.1.2C] 
X 
The reference for the TOE shall be unique to each version of the TOE. [ACM_CAP.1.1C] X 
All configuration items for the TOE shall be labeled with the TOE’s refere
[ACM_CAP.3.2C- EXP2] 
nce. X 
The CM documentation shall include a configuration list and a CM plan. 
[ACM_AUT.1.2D, ACM_CAP.3.3C] 
X 
The configuration list shall describe the configuration items that comprise the TOE. 
[ACM_CAP.2.4C] 
X 
The CM system shall provide an automated means by which only authorized changes are 
made to the TOE implementation representation. [ACM_AUT.1.1C] 
X 
The CM system shall provide an automated means by which only authorized changes are 
made to all configuration items [ACM_AUT.2.1C] 
X 
The CM system shall provide an automated means to support the generat
[ACM_AUT.1.2C] 
ion of the TOE. X 
The CM plan shall describe the automated tools used in the CM system. 
[ACM_AUT.1.3C] 
X 
The CM plan shall describe how the automated tools are used in the CM system. 
[ACM_AUT.1.4C] 
X 
The CM system shall provide an automated means to ascertain the changes between th
TOE and its preceding version. [ACM_AUT.2.5C] 
e X 
M system shall pro
items that are affected by the modification of a given configuration items. 
[ACM_AUT.2.6C] 
M system shall uniquely identify all con
The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the 
configuration items. [ACM_CAP.2.5C] 
X 
M plan shall describe how th
The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is operating in accordance with the
CM plan. [ACM_CAP.3.8C] 
 X 
The CM documentation shall provide evidence that all configuration items have been 
and are being effectively maintained under the CM system. [ACM_CAP.3.9C] 
X 
The CM system shall provide measures such that only authorized changes are made to X 
the configuration items. [ACM_CAP.3.10C] 
tor action elements:  
The TOE shall be labeled with its reference. [ACM_CAP.1.2C]] X 
The C vide an automated means to identify all other configuration X 
The C figuration items. [ACM_CAP.2.6C] X 
The C e CM system is used. [ACM_CAP.3.7C] X 
Evalua  
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [ACM_AUT.1.1E, ACM_CAP.1.1E, 
ACM_SCP.1.1E] 
X 
 
 
equipment is the one shipped  
e official version.  For more critical 
A.4 Confidence that 
A.4.1 Objectives 
Requiring control over the delivery procedures provides assurance that the equipment has not been 
tampered with via the distribution channels.  At the very least, DTRA should know the way in which the 
equipment will be delivered so they know they have received th
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equipment, the distribution channels need to be controlled to prevent efforts to exchange the official 
version with one masquerading as that critical piece of equipment. 
 addition to ensuring that the equipment received was correct, DTRA needs to control the delivery of 
ents through the assessor establishing what the procedure is, and reporting 
at to DTRA.  It also may be accomplished via contractual means and the assessor does not need to apply 
s.  
 D AAL3 
In
the equipment to the operational sites. 
 
A.4.2 Application Notes 
DTRA needs to know the distribution channels of its equipment. However, it is not the goal to have 
pristine documentation of these procedures.  Therefore, the assessor needs to verify that procedures are 
followed and that DTRA knows when it has received the equipment expected.  Therefore, DTRA may 
choose to fulfill these requirem
th
much rigor to the procedure
 
elivery procedure 
eveloper Action Elements: 
The developer shall document procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the 
user. [ADO_DEL.1.1D] 
X 
The developer shall use the delivery procedures. [ADO_DEL.1.2D] X 
ontent and presentation of evidence elements: 
elivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain 
security when distributing versions of the TOE to a user’s site. [ADO_   
X 
elivery documentat
measures provide for the detection of modifications, or any discrepancy between 
the developer’s master copy and the version received at the user site. 
[ADO_DEL.2.2C] 
The delivery documentation shall describe how the various procedures allow detection 
er 
O_DEL.2.3C]
X 
of attempts to masquerade as the developer, even in cases in which the develop
has sent nothing to the user’s site. [AD  
D
C
The d
DEL.1.1C]
The d ion shall describe how the various procedures and technical X 
Evaluator action elements:  
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
con
X 
tent and presentation of evidence. 
 
A.5 Confidence through the process of equipment development  
for testing and identification of residual vulnerabilities 
by giving them clues to potential ‘weak’ points in the equipment design and implementation.  It also 
the equipment is designed to accomplish its functions is often described in a high level design.  The 
 
A.5.1 Objectives 
The more DTRA knows about the design of equipment put to monitoring use, the more they will be able 
to ascertain ways in which the security features of the equipment could be compromised by an adversary.  
Knowledge of the design helps the assessor plan 
means that the assessor can spend less time using ‘brute force’ testing techniques and can perform much 
of the vulnerability assessment through analysis.  
There are different levels of abstraction in the design.  They serve different purposes and are usually 
meant for different audiences.  The users of the equipment, and the assessors, need to know how to 
interface with the equipment.  These interfaces are generally provided in a functional specification.  How 
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details of how the design is then accomplished can then be described in a low-level design. Finally, the 
equipment is put together using some type of implementation representation.  In traditional computing 
equipment this is often termed the ‘source code.’  Although equipment that is mostly hardware-based 
hich it is put together to accomplish those tasks.  The more the 
ssessor(s) understand, the more likely they will be able to have confidence that the flaws in the 
 
 design questions to supplement the documentation.  Although the documentation 
her levels require that the 
xt be provided in a ‘semiformal’ style. This means that the terminology should be more tightly 
oid ambiguity in the descriptions. 
 
to plan their 
teraction with the equipment, including testing through those interfaces.  They will also use these 
he equipment’s functional security requirements are met.  
F AAL3 
often does not have such source code they have some other representation that is how the design is 
transfigured into the actual equipment.  
Having the different levels of abstraction helps an assessor understand what the equipment is trying to 
accomplish, and the means by w
a
equipment have been minimized. 
A.5.2 Application notes 
A primary goal in the development of monitoring equipment is to ensure that the final implementation 
reflects the functional requirements laid on that equipment.  It is a secondary goal to have the eventual 
design fully documented so the equipment can be maintained over its life cycle.  Therefore, the developer 
should make sure that the design documentation reflects the final product and the assessor should use 
these documents in their search for possible flaws.  However, the assessor may use verbal communication 
to get explanations of
should not be in error, there should not be a necessity to change the documentation to reflect all the 
assessor’s questions.  
A major difference between the design documentation requirements is that hig
te
controlled, using terms and structures that av
A.5.3 Functional specification 
The functional specification is a high-level description of the user-visible interface and behavior of the 
TSF.  It is usually derived from user documentation that provides the form, content and effects of the 
means of user interaction with the equipment. The assessor will use this information 
in
interfaces to determine that all of t
 
unctional specification  
Developer Action Elements: 
The developer shall provide a functional specification. [ADV_FSP.1.1D] X 
The functional specification shall describe the TSF and its external interfaces using an 
informal style [ADV_FSP.1.1C] 
X 
The functional specification shall describe the TSF and its external interface
semiformal style, supported by informal, explanatory text where appr
s using an 
opriate 
[ADV_FSP.3.1C] 
X 
nctional specification shall be internally consistent. [ADV_FSP.1.2C] 
TSF interfaces, providing details of effects, exceptions and error messages, as 
appropriate. [ADV_FSP.1.3C] 
X 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
The fu X 
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use of all external 
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Functional specification  AAL3 
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use of all
TSF interfaces, providing com
 external 
plete details of all effects, exceptions and error 
te. [ADV_FSP.2.3C] messages, as appropria
X 
The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF. [ADV_FSP.1.4C] X 
nctional specification shall include rationale that the TS
represented. [ADV_FSP.2.5C] 
tor action elements:  
The fu F is completely X 
Evalua
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [ADV_FSP.1.1E] 
X 
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and 
TOE security functional requirements. 
[ADV_FSP.1.2E] 
X 
complete instantiation of the 
 
 
A.5.4 High-level design 
The high-level design of a TOE provides a description of the TSF in terms of major structural units (i.e. 
subsystems) and relates these units to the functions that they provide. The high-level design requirements 
are intended to provide assurance that the TOE provides an architecture appropriate to implement the 
TOE security functional requirements.  
The high-level design refines the functional specification into subsystems. For each subsystem of the 
SF, the high-level design describes its purpose and function, and identifies the security functions 
contained in the subsystem. The interrelationships of all subsystems are also defined in the high-level 
nships will be represented as external interfaces for data flow, control flow, etc., 
as appropriate.  
 
AAL3 
T
design. These interrelatio
High level design  
eveloper Action Elements: 
The developer shall provide the high-level design of the TSF. [ADV_HLD.1.1D] X 
The presentation of the high-level design shall be semiformal. [ADV_HLD.3.1C] X 
igh-level design shall be internally consist
The high-level design shall describe the structure of the TSF in terms of subsystems. 
[ADV_HLD.1.3C] 
X 
igh-level design shall describe the security functionality provided by each 
subsystem of the TSF. [ADV
The high-level design shall identify any underlying hardware, firmware, and/or software 
required by the TSF with a presentation of the functions provided by the 
supporting protection mechanisms implemented in that hardware, firmware, or 
software. [ADV_HLD.1.5C] 
X 
The high-level design shall identify all interfaces to the subsystems of the TSF. 
[ADV_HLD.1.6C] 
X 
igh-level design shall identify which of the in
are externally visible. [ADV_HLD.1.7C] 
the subsystems of the TSF, providing details of effects, exceptions and error 
D
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
The h ent. [ADV_HLD.1.2C] X 
The h
_HLD.1.4C] 
X 
The h terfaces to the subsystems of the TSF X 
The high-level design shall describe the purpose and method of use of all interfaces to X 
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High level design  
AAL3 
messages, as appropriate. [ADV_HLD.2.8C] 
igh-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE into TSP
other subsystems. [A
The high-level design shall justify that the identified means of achieving separation, 
including any protection mechanism, are sufficient to ensure clear and effective 
rcing from non-TSP-enforcing functions. separation of TSP-enfo
[ADV_HLD.4.10C] 
X 
igh-level design shall justify that the TSP mechanisms ar
the security functions identified in the high-level design. [ADV_HLD.4.11C] 
tor action elements:  
The h -enforcing and 
DV_HLD.2.9C] 
X 
The h e sufficient to implement X 
Evalua
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [ADV_HLD.1.1E] 
X 
The evaluator shall determine that the high-level design is an accurate and complete 
instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements [ADV_HLD.2.2E] 
X 
 
 
A.5.5 Low-level design 
The low-level design of a TOE provides a description of the internal workings of the TSF in terms of 
modules and their interrelationships and dependencies.  The low-level design provides assurance that the 
SF subsystems have been correctly and effectively refined. 
F, the low-level design describes its purpose, function, interfaces, 
L AAL3 
T
For each module of the TS
dependencies, and the implementation of any TSP-enforcing functions. 
 
ow-level design  
eveloper Action Elements: 
The developer shall provide the low-level design of the TSF. [ADV_LLD.1.1D]  X 
ontent and presentation of evidence elements: 
The presentation of the low-level design shall be semiformal. [ADV_LLD.2.1C] X 
w-level design shall be internally consistent. [ADV_LLD.1.2C] 
The low-level design shall describe the purpose of each module. [ADV_LLD.1.4C] X 
provided security functionality and dependencies on other modules. 
[ADV_LLD.1.5C] 
The low-level design shall describe how each TSP-enforcing function is provided. 
[ADV_LLD.1.6C] 
X 
The low-level design shall identify all interfaces to the modules of the TSF. 
[ADV_LLD.1.7C] 
X 
w-level design shall identify whic
externally visible. [ADV_LLD.1.8C] 
w-level design shall describe the purpose and method of use of all interfaces to the 
modules of the TSF, providing details of eff
as appropriate. [ADV_LLD.1.9C] 
modules of the TSF, p
D
C
The lo X 
The low-level design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules. [ADV_LLD.1.3C] X 
The low-level design shall define the interrelationships between the modules in terms of X 
The lo h of the interfaces to the modules of the TSF are X 
The lo
ects, exceptions and error messages, 
X 
The low-level design shall describe the purpose and method of use of all interfaces to the 
roviding complete details of all effects, exceptions and error 
X 
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Low-level design  AAL3 
messages, as appropriate. [ADV_LLD.2.9C] 
w-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE 
other modules. [ADV_LLD.1.10C] 
tor action elements:  
The lo into TSP-enforcing and X 
Evalua
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [ADV_LLD.1.1E] 
X 
The evaluator shall determine that the low-level design is an accurate and complete 
instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements. [ADV_LLD.1.2E] 
X 
 
 
A.5.6 Implementation representation 
epresentation in the form of source code, firmware, hardware 
 
Im AAL3 
The description of the implem
dr
entation r
awings, etc. captures the detailed internal workings of the TSF in support of analysis. 
plementation representation 
The developer shall provide the implementation representation for a selected subset of X 
the TSF. [ADV_IMP.1.1D] 
eveloper shall provide the implementation representation for the entire TSF. 
[ADV_IMP.2.1D] 
ontent and presentation of evidence elements: 
The implementation representation shall unambiguously define the TSF to a level of 
detail such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions. 
[ADV_IMP.1.1C] 
X 
plementation representatio
The implementation representation shall describe the relationship between all portions of X 
the implementation. [ADV_IMP.2.3C] 
plementation representation shall be structured into small and com
sections. [ADV_IMP.3.4C] 
tor action elements:  
content and presentation of evidence. [ADV_IMP.1.1E] 
aluator shall determine that the implementation representation provided i
accurate and comp
Developer Action Elements: 
The d X 
C
The im n shall be internally consistent. [ADV_IMP.1.2C] X 
The im prehensible X 
Evalua
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for X 
The ev s an 
lete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements. 
[ADV_IMP.1.2E] 
X 
The evaluator shall determine that the least abstract TSF representation is an accurate 
and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements. 
[AD
X 
V_IMP.2.3E] 
 
s on the minimization of the complexity of the design allows an assessor to more easily 
 
 
A.5.7 Complexity of the internal design 
Requirement
understand the equipment and all the ways it could be used both, including ways to circumvent the 
security features. It imposes some techniques to help ensure that the equipment is as simple as practical 
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for that equipment type. This set of requirements is likely only to be applicable in small, very critical 
equipment.  
The CC requires that only access control functions be simple enough to be analyzed. Access control may 
not generally be a critical security function in DTRA monitoring equipment. Instead it is imperative that 
any security function relied upon to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the monitoring information 
be simple enough to analyze so that potential flaws can be identified.  
The requirements call for an ‘architectural description’. This description is similar to the low-level design, 
 that it is concerned with the modules of the TSF. In fact, it would likely be incorporated in the low-
ver, this description provides evidence of the mo
 the interaction among modules while the low-level design describes the 
de
 
In AAL3 
in
level design documentation. Howe dularity and 
minimization of complexity of
sign of the modules.  
ternal design complexity  
eveloper Action Elements: 
The developer shall design and structure the TSF in a modular fashion that avoids 
unnecessary interaction between the modules of the design. [ADV_INT.1.1D] 
 
eveloper shall design and structure the TSF in a layered fashion that minimiz
mutual interactions between the layers of the design. [ADV_INT.2.3D] 
eveloper shall design and structure the TSF in such a wa
complexity of the portions of the entire TSF. [ADV_INT.3.4D] 
 
The developer shall design and structure the TSF s
security functions] are simple enough to be 
uch that the [assignment: critical 
analyzed  [ADV_INT.3.5D-EXP]
 
The developer shall ensure that functions whose objectives are not relevant for the TS
are excluded from the TSF modules. [ADV_INT.3.6D] 
F  
The developer shall provide an architectural description. [ADV_INT.1.2D]  
t and presentation of evidence elements: 
The architectural description shall identify the modules of the TSF and shall specify 
which portions of the TSF enforce the [assignment: critical security functions] 
policies. [ADV_INT.3.1C-EXP] 
 
The architectural description shall describe the purpose, interface, parameters, a
effects of each module of the TSF. [ADV_INT.1.2C] 
nd sid -e  
The architectural description shall describe how the TSF design provides for largely 
independent modules that avoid unnecessary interactions. [ADV_INT.1.3C] 
 
The architectural description shall describe the layering architecture. [ADV_INT.2.4C]  
The architectural description shall show that the mutual interactions have been 
aminimized, and justify those that rem in. [ADV_INT.2.5C] 
 
The architectural description shall describe how the entire TSF has been structured to 
minimize complexity. [ADV_INT.3.6C] 
 
The architectural description shall justify the inclusion of any non-TSP-enforcing 
modules in the TSF. [ADV_INT.3.7C] 
 
tor action elements:  
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [ADV_INT.1.1E] 
 
D
The d es  
The d y that minimizes the 
Conten
Evalua
The evaluator shall determine that both the low-level design and the implementation 
representation are in compliance with the architectural description. 
[ADV_INT.1.2E] 
 
The evaluator shall confirm that the portions of the TSF that enforce the [assignment: 
critical security functions] policies are simple enough to be analyzed. [ADV_INT.3.3E-
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Internal design complexity  AAL3 
EXP] 
 
 
A.5.8 Correspondence between the levels of design abstraction  
The correspondence between the various TSF representations (i.e. TOE summary specification, functional 
pecification, high-level design, low-level design, implementation representation) addresses the correct 
F representation pro This 
tive results of correspondence 
 
of abstraction AAL3 
s
and complete instantiation of the requirements to the least abstract TS
step-wise refinement and the cumula
vided.  
conclusion is achieved by 
determinations between all adjacent abstractions of representation. 
Correspondence between design levels 
eveloper Action Elements: 
eveloper shall provide an analysis of correspondence between all adjacent pairs of
TSF representations that are provided. [ADV_RCR.1.1D] 
For each adjacent pair of provided TSF representations, the analysis shall demonstrate 
s 
 representation. 
[ADV_RCR.1.1C] 
X 
that all relevant security functionality of the more abstract TSF representation i
correctly and completely refined in the less abstract TSF
D
The d  X 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
Evaluator action elements:  
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [ADV_RCR.1.1E] 
X 
 
 
A.5.9 Equipment security policy model 
It is possible for a piece of equipment to have several functions but not have a cohesive security policy to 
which each of those functions can contribute.  It is often helpful to see the rules and characteristics of 
tiate with the 
hich policies (or equipment functions) need a description as outlined 
cause natural language descriptions of the rules and characteristics can be 
pr sefulness of this comp e set of 
de ’.  
Equip AAL3 
each security function, and to relate them to the overall security goals of the equipment. The policy 
statement (or model) will help the assessor see that the equipment is working as a consistent whole toward 
reaching its goals. A central notion in the security policy is the definition of what it means for the 
equipment to be in a ‘secure’ state’.  
It is important to note that the phrase ‘that can be modeled’ allows the developer to nego
assessor (and DTRA) to establish w
in the requirements.  This is be
oduced for all the functions of the equipment. The question is then the u let
scriptions. Therefore that phrase can be interpreted as policies that are ‘worth modeling
ment security policy  
Developer Action Elements: 
The developer shall provide a security policy model. [ADV_SPM.1.1D] X 
The developer shall demonstrate correspondence between the functional specification 
and the TSP model. [ADV_SPM.1.2D] 
X 
The TSP model shall be informal. [ADV_SPM.1.1C] X 
SP model shall be semiformal. [ADV_SPM.2.1C] 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
The T X 
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Equipment security policy  AAL3 
The TSP model shall describe the rules and characteristics of all policies of the TS
can be modeled. [ADV_SPM.1.2C] 
P that X 
SP model shall include a rationale that demonstrates that it is consistent an
complete with resp
[ADV_SPM.1.3C] 
emonstration of correspondence between the TSP model and the functional 
specification shall show that al
specification are consi
[ADV_SPM.1.4C] 
 the functional specification is at least semiformal, the d
The T d 
ect to all polices of the TSP that can be modeled.  
X 
The d
l the security functions in the functional 
stent and complete with respect to the TSP model. 
X 
Where emonstration of 
correspondence between the TSP model and the functional specification shall be 
semiformal. [ADV_SPM.2.5C] 
X 
Evaluator action elements:  
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
on of evidence. [ADV_SPM.1.1E] 
X 
content and presentati
 
.6.1 Objectives 
e personnel, installing, configuring, maintaining and using the 
inister the equipment (administrator) and those who use 
personnel needing to interact with the equipment have the 
ion 
necessary to complete their assigned tasks.  
 
A.6 Guidance documentation delivered with the equipment 
A
Guidance documentation allows thos
equipment to do so in full knowledge of the security aspects of the equipment. This guidance should be 
complete, consistent and should be written so that the user can easily follow the instructions therein.  
 
A.6.2 Application Notes 
Generally a developer provides usage manuals when they deliver a set of equipment. These include 
instructions on how to set up, install, and operate the equipment. There are generally two audiences for 
this documentation: those that maintain and adm
the resources of the equipment (user). Users usually needs to know a subset of what the administrator 
needs to know.  Administrator guidance is intended to be used by those persons responsible for installing, 
configuring, maintaining, and administering the TOE in a correct manner for maximum security. User 
guidance refers is intended to be used by non-administrative users of the TOE, including those using the 
TOE’s externals interfaces (e.g. programmers).  
All requirements for guidance documentation have been combined here, although there may be a series of 
documentation, each geared the different audiences. Therefore, the terms ‘administrator guidance’ and 
‘user guidance’ have been combined into the one term ‘guidance documentation’. This is because the 
definition of ‘user’ and ‘administrator’ can sometimes be blurred for monitoring equipment, as 
operational users may only be those that configure and maintain the equipment.  In addition, the purpose 
of these requirements is to ensure that all 
information they need to do so securely.  The type and usage of the equipment will dictate how many 
documents that will need to be. Therefore, whenever the term  ‘authorized user types’ is used it is meant 
to capture both classical roles of administrators and operational users. It also captures the notion that 
different types of users may require different information and requires that each user have the informat
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Installation, generation and start-up procedures are often considered part of the administrator guidance 
information that may be used by different personnel. The administrator 
gu  its o ational 
environm ent up in the first place. 
 
U AAL3 
but are of a different type of 
idance addresses those things that a user needs to know in maintaining the equipment in
ent. Installation guidance contains information on setting the equipm
per
sage guidance documentation 
eveloper Action Elements: 
The developer shall provide guidance documentat
type. 
ion addressed to each authorized user 
refined  
X 
[AGD_ADM.1.1D, AGD_USR.1.1D, AVA_MSU.1.1D  - ]
The developer shall document procedures necessary for the secure installation, 
generation, and start-up of the TOE. [ADO_IGS.1.1D] 
X 
The developer shall provide the TOE pre-installed in the [assignment: defined secure 
state for the DTRA environment]. [ADO_IGS.1.2D-EXP3] 
X 
ontent and presentation of evidence elements: 
uidance documentation shall be complete, clear, consistent and reaso
[AVA_MSU.1.2C] 
X 
The guidance documentation shall describe the functions and interfaces available to each 
of the authorized user types of the TOE. [AGD_ADM.1.1C, AGD_USR.1.1C -
refined] 
X 
The guidance documentation shall describe the use of authorized user-accessible 
security functions provided by the TOE [AGD_USR.1.2C - refined] 
X 
uidance documentation shall describe how to administer the TOE in a secure 
manner. [AGD_ADM.1.2C -refined] 
uidance documentation shall list all assumptions about the intended environm
[AVA_MSU.1.3C]  
X 
uidance documentation shall contain warnings about functions and privileges that 
should be 
AGD_USR.1.3C  - refined]  
For each authorized user type, the guidance documentation shall clearly present all 
authorized user responsibilities necessary for secure operation of the TOE, 
including those related to assumptions regarding authorized user behavior found 
in the statement of TOE security environment. [AGD_ADM.1.4C, AGD_USR.1.4C  
- refined] 
X 
uidance documentation shall describe all security parameters under the control of 
the authorized user, indicating secure values as appropriate. [AGD_ADM.1.5C - 
refined]  
The guidance documentation shall describe each type of security-relevant event 
to the authorized user functions that need to be performed, including chan
security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF. [A
relative 
ging the 
GD_ADM.1.6C - 
refined]  
X 
The guidance documentation shall be consistent with all other documentation supplied 
for evaluation. [AGD_ADM.1.7C, AGD_USR.1.5C - refined] 
X 
The guidance documentation shall describe all security requirements for the IT 
environment that are relevant to each of the authorized user types. 
[AGD_ADM.1.8C, AGD_USR.1.6C- refined] 
X 
The guidance documentation shall describe the steps necessary for secure installation, 
generation, and start-up of the TOE. [ADO_IGS.1.1C - refined] 
X 
The guidance documentation shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE 
 
X 
(including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences
D
C
The g nable. 
The g X 
The g ent. 
The g
controlled in a secure processing environment. [AGD_ADM.1.3C, 
X 
The g X 
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Usage guidance documentation AAL3 
and implications for maintaining secure operation. [AVA_MSU.1.1C] 
The guidance documentation shall list all requirements for external security measures 
(including external procedural, physical and personnel controls). 
[AVA_MSU.1.4C] 
X 
tor action elements:  
aluator shall confirm that the infor
content and presentation of evidence.  
aluator shall determine that the installation, gene
Evalua
The ev mation provided meets all requirements for X 
The ev ration, and start-up procedures 
result in a secure configuration. [ADO_IGS.1.2E] 
X 
The evaluator shall repeat all configuration and installation procedures to confirm that 
the  guidance 
documentation. [AVA_MSU.1.2E] 
X 
 TOE can be configured and used securely using only the supplied
The evaluator shall determine that the use of the guidance documentation allows all 
etected. [AVA_MSU.1.3E] 
X 
insecure states to be d
 
ural, personnel, and other security measures that 
ay be used in the development environment to protect the TOE. It includes the physical security of the 
ures used to select development staff. It is related to configuration 
revention of unauthorized access to the facility (ies) involved in the 
.7.2 Application notes 
e measures to protect the development environment. 
Th s and can certain 
th tual means and not 
 
Secur AAL3
 
A.7 Assurance through securing the development environment 
 
A.7.1 Objectives 
Development security is concerned with physical, proced
m
development location and any proced
management but deals more with the p
production of the monitoring equipment. This is important because an adversary might interfere with the 
production of the monitoring equipment, including the insertion of ‘back-doors’ or other weak points that 
could later be exploited in the operational environment  
 
A
The important thing is that the developer has suitabl
ese need to be explained to the assessor in a way that they understand those measure
at they are being used.  DTRA may choose to impose these requirements via contrac
 as
ask the assessor to rigorously verify its application.  
ing the development environment 
er Action Elements: 
The developer shall produce development security documentation. [ALC_DVS.1.1D] X 
t and presentation of evidence elements: 
evelopment securit
personnel, and other se
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its 
development environment. [ALC_DVS.1.1C] 
The development security documentation shall provide evidence that these security 
measures are followed during the development and maintenance of the TOE. 
[ALC_DVS.1.2C] 
X 
Develop
Conten
The d y documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, 
curity measures that are necessary to protect the 
X 
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Securing the development environment AAL3
Evaluator action elements:  
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [ALC_DVS.1.1E] 
X 
The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied. [ALC_DVS.1.2E] X 
 
 
A.8 Assurance through life cycle tools and techniques 
A.8.1 Objectives 
Assurance can be gained in the final implementation of the monitoring equipment via the establishment of 
adequate procedures, tools and techniques used to develop, analyze, implement and maintain that 
equipment.  These are termed the overall ‘life cycle model’ in the requirements in the table below.  
Although the use of such a life cycle model does not guarantee that the resulting equipment will be 
ld be a model accepted through other standards bodies (e.g., CMM, 
erefore only addresses 
ols in ALC_TAT.  That has been expanded here so that the developer can easily see that appropriate 
the CC only states that tools need to be nted, 
 That has been made explicit here to aid the developer in 
o.  
In additi e been reordered to be more in line with the CC paradigm of having a list 
of  the list o ow the 
ev n to document options 
chosen and that was reordered to be a content requirement on the documentation.  
 
L AAL3 
without fault, it does give more assurance that faults were not introduced via sloppy processes.  
 
A.8.2 Application notes 
The CC defines a standardized life cycle model as one approved by a ‘group of experts’.  Therefore, any 
life cycle model approved by DTRA can meet this requirement.  This approval can be gained through 
contractual negotiations and/or cou
ISO).  
The CC presentation of these elements often causes confusion.  They have therefore been reworded, and 
reordered, here but have the same intent as those words.  Therefore they are marked as ‘refined’ not as 
‘explicitly-stated’.  For instance, the CC states that tools includes techniques and th
to
tools and techniques could be used.  In addition, 
 be used. 
docume
only implying that they must
understanding what they must d
on, the requirements hav
 actions for the developer to take, the quality measures for those actions, and f h
aluator confirms those actions.  For instance, the CC had a developer actio
ife cycle tools and techniques 
eveloper Action Elements: 
The developer shall establish a life cycle model to be used in the development of the X 
TOE. [ALC_LCD.1.1D] 
The developer shall provide life cycle definition documentation. [ALC_LCD.1.2D] X 
The developer shall measure the TOE development using the life cycle model. 
[ALC_LCD.3.3D] 
X 
The developer shall use development tools and techniques, as appropriate, in the 
production of the TOE. [ALC_TAT.1.1D – refined] 
X 
eveloper shall use implementation stan
cycle model for all parts of the TOE. [ALC_TAT.3.3D – refined] 
D
The d dards, as appropriate, as part of their life X 
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Life cycle tools and techniques AAL3 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
fe cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and 
maintenance of the TOE. [ALC_LCD.1.2C] 
The life cycle model shall be measurable. [ALC_LCD.3.3D – refined] X 
fe cycle model shal
The life cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and 
maintain the TOE. [ALC_LCD.1.1C] 
X 
The life cycle definition documentation shall explain how the model is used to d
and maintain the TOE. [ALC_LCD.2.4C ] 
evelop X 
The life cycle definition documentation shall describe the measurable nature of the life 
cycle model, including details of the arithmetic parameters and/or metrics used to 
measure the TOE against the model. [ALC_LCD.3.1C  - refined] 
X 
fe cycle definition documentation shall explain why the m
[ALC_LCD.2.3C ] 
fe cycle definition documentation shall explain how the model is used to
and maintain the TOE. [ALC_LCD.2.4C ] 
fe cycle definition documentation shall demonstrate compliance with
standardized life cycle mod
The life cycle definition documentation shall provide the results of the measurements of
the TOE development using the measurable life cycle model. [ALC_LC
 
D.3.6C] 
X 
fe cycle definition
techniques used for the
The life cycle definition documentation shall describe the selected implementation-
dependent options of the development tools. [ALC_TAT.1.2D - refined] 
X 
The life cycle definition documentation shall unambiguously define the meaning o
statements used by the tools and techniques in the
f all 
 implementation. 
[ALC_TAT.1.2C  - refined] 
X 
The li X 
The li l be standardized. [ALC_LCD.3.3D – refined] X 
The li odel was chosen. X 
The li  develop X 
The li  the 
el.  [ALC_LCD.2.5C] 
X 
The li  documentation shall identify the development tools and 
 TOE. [ALC_TAT.1.1D - refined] 
X 
The life cycle definition documentation shall unambiguously define the meaning of all 
ns used in the tools and techniques for the TOE. 
[ALC_TAT.1.3C] 
X 
implementation optio
Evaluator action elements:   
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [ALC_LCD.1.1E, ALC_TAT.1.1E] 
X 
The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards claimed have been 
applied. [ALC_LCD.3.2D – EXP, ALC_TAT.2.2E] 
X 
 
 
A.9 Testing 
A.9.1 Objectives 
Testing is used to establish that the functional requirements are met. Testing provides assurance that the 
monitoring equipment satisfies at least the monitoring equipment requirements, and includes both positive 
testing based on the functional requirements and negative testing to check that undesirable behavior is 
absent.  
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A.9.2 Developer Functionality Testing  
A.9.2.1 Objectives 
tood. The assessment is achieved through 
n examination of the developer testing approach and a review of the results of the testing. The approach 
testing (i.e. coverage of the functions) and the level of abstraction of the 
l representation) were sufficient to adequately exercise the ent’s 
 
Testing the functionality is needed in order to demonstrate that all the monitoring equipment security 
functions perform as specified. The need is for sufficient testing to be performed and to provide sufficient 
test documentation to enable the testing performed to be unders
a
should show that the scope of the 
testing (i.e. depth of the functiona  equipm
functions. 
A.9.2.2 Application notes 
Th  dete
th  prov  in the 
do  unde nd the 
ap
 
T AAL3 
e requirements for the contents of the test documentation are such that an assessor can rmine that 
e approach taken was sound. This does not mean that a great deal of analysis needs to be
cumentation but rather must contain enough information so that the assessor can
ided
rsta
proach sufficiently to make a judgment as to its sufficiency.  
esting the Functionality 
er Action Elements: 
The developer shall provide test documentation. [ATE_FUN.1.2D] X 
t and presentation of evidence elements: 
The test documentation shall consist of test plans, test procedure descriptions
test results and actual test results. [ATE_FUN.1.1C] 
, expected X 
st plans shall identify the security functions to be test
the tests to be performed. [ATE_FUN.1.2C] 
st documentation shall describe test procedure ordering dependencies. 
[ATE_FUN.2.6C - refined] 
X 
st documentation shall show the correspondence between the tests identified in th
test documentation and the TSF as described in the functional specification. 
[ATE_COV.1.1C - refined] 
st documentation shall demonstrate that the correspondence between the TSF a
described in the functional specification and the tests identified in the test 
documentation is complete. [ATE_COV.2.2C - refined] 
The test documentation shall demonstrate that the tests identified in the test 
documentation are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF operat
ign.  
es in accordance 
[ATE_DPT.1.1C - refined]with its high-level des
X 
The test documentation shall demonstrate that the tests identified in the test 
documentation are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF operates in accordanc
with its high-level design, low-level design and implem
e 
entation representation. 
[ATE_DPT.3.1C - refined] 
X 
Develop
The developer shall test the TSF and document the results. [ATE_FUN.1.1D] X 
Conten
The te ed and describe the goal of X 
The te
The te e X 
The te s X 
The test procedure descriptions shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the 
scenarios for testing each security function. These scenarios shall include any 
ordering dependencies on the results of other tests. [ATE_FUN.1.3C] 
X 
The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful execution 
of the tests. [ATE_FUN.1.4C] 
X 
Page 40  
Authentication Assurance Level Application to the Inventory Sampling Measurement System 
 
 
Testing the Functionality AAL3 
The test results from the developer execution of the tests shall demonstrate that each 
[ATE_FUN.1.5C] 
X 
tested security function behaved as specified. 
Evaluator action elements:  
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [ATE_FUN.1.1E] 
X 
 
 
A.9.3 Independent Testing 
A.9.3.1 Objectives 
The aim is to independently demonstrate that the security functions perform as specified. Such assessor 
t may exercise the equipment in different ways than did 
e functional testing. However, the more thorough the developer testing, the more difficult it may be for 
testing techniques. Therefore, the assessor will need to make a judgment 
between repeating developer testing and performing new tests.  
 
testing includes selecting and repeating a sample, or all, of the developer tests. It also includes 
independently developing and executing tests tha
th
the assessor to think of more 
over the appropriate balance 
A.9.3.2 Application Notes 
Th lly call for the 
w
In AAL3 
e following requirements call for the evaluator to perform the tests but do not specifica
ay in which they plan or document those tests. 
 
dependent Testing 
er Action Elements: 
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing. [ATE_IND.2.1D] X 
The TOE shall be suitable for testing. [ATE_IND.2.1C] X 
eveloper shall provide an equivalent set 
developer’s functional testing of the TSF. [ATE_IND.2.2C] 
X 
tor action elements:  
Develop
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
The d of resources to those that were used in the 
Evalua
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
con E_IND.2.1E] 
X 
tent and presentation of evidence. [AT
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF as appropriate to confirm that the TOE 
ified. [ATE_IND.2.2E] 
X 
operates as spec
The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to verify the X 
developer test results. [ATE_IND.2.3E] 
The evaluator shall execute all tests in the test documentation to verify the developer test 
results. [ATE_IND.3.3E] 
X 
 
 
A.9.4 Strength of probabilistic functions 
A.9.4.1 Objectives 
Ev y still be possible to 
defeat it anisms. For those 
en if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it ma
 because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mech
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functions a qualification of their security behavior can be made using the results of a quantitative or 
statistica mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. 
f TOE security function claim.  
 
Streng AAL3 
l analysis of the security behavior of these 
The qualification is made in the form of a strength o
th of TOE security function evaluation 
eveloper Action Elements: 
The developer shall perform a strength of TOE security function analysis for each 
mechanism identified in the ST as having a strength of TOE security function 
claim. ] [AVA_SOF.1.1D
X 
Content and presentation of evidence elements: 
For each mechanism with a strength of TOE security function claim the strength of TOE 
ds the minimumsecurity function analysis shall show that it meets or excee  
strength level defined in the PP/ST. [AVA_SOF.1.1C] 
X 
D
For each mechanism with a specific strength of TOE security function claim the strength 
of TOE security function analysis shall show that it meets or exceeds the specific 
he PP/ST. [AVA_SOF.1.2C] 
X 
strength of function metric defined in t
Evaluator action elements:  
The evaluator shall co
content and pre
nfirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
sentation of evidence. [AVA_SOF.1.1E] 
X 
The evaluator shall confirm that the strength claims are correct. [AVA_SOF.1.2E] X 
 
 
Identification of equipment vulnerabilities 
 
A.9.4.2 Objectives 
The assessor performs an analysis of the monitoring equipment to determine if vulnerabilities may exist. 
 the results of all the assurance measures to postulate possible points at 
which the equipment might be compromised. The assessor then tests the equipment to determine whether 
The assessor does this by using
those vulnerabilities exist. The developer should also take the possibility of equipment vulnerabilities into 
account when making design decisions in the development and implementation of the equipment. They 
therefore should provide some evidence that vulnerabilities have been considered and how they have been 
eliminated, minimized, or made to be detectable.  
 
A.9.4.3 Application Notes 
The vulnerability identification for DTRA monitoring equipment is, by its nature, different than that 
expected in the CC. The CC assumes a type of threat environment and requires that any vulnerability that 
is an unrealistic 
pproach). However, they will require some level of compromise to be prevented and can provide a list of 
t process. This list is represented as an ‘assignment operation illed 
ent.  
In r in looking r and 
demonst will provide a list of 
exists in that environment be eliminated. Monitoring equipment is placed in an extremely high threat 
environment and needs to know when the equipment is compromised, not necessarily to prevent the 
compromise from happening. This is because the cost for developers to provide functionality to prevent 
such compromises is too high for DTRA to bear (and for host supply equipment, this 
a
those as input to the assessmen ’ to be f
in for a given equipment assessm
 addition, the amount of analysis and testing performed by the assesso
rating potential vulnerabilities is also a cost factor. Therefore, DTRA 
 fo
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vulnerability types to take into account in the assessment and will provide a degree of effort that the 
as d that list.  
 
AAL3 
sessor is expected to undertake in identifying potential vulnerabilities beyon
Vulnerability analysis  
eveloper Action Elements: 
The developer shall perform and document an analysis of the TOE deliverables
searching for ways in which a user can violate the TSP. [AVA_VLA.2.1D
 
] 
X 
eveloper shall document the disposition of identified vulnerabi
[AVA_VLA.2.2D] 
ontent and presentation of evidence elements: 
The documentation shall describe the methods used to identify TOE vulnerabili
[AVA_VLA.2.xC - EXP] 
ties. X 
The documentation shall describe the measures taken to address the identified 
vulnerabilities, including the degree to which each has been eliminated, 
 be detectminimized or made to able. [AVA_VLA.2.1C - EXP] 
X 
The documentation shall justify that the TOE is resistant to [assignment: DTRA defin
list of] penetration attacks. [AVA_VLA.2.2C - EXP] 
ed X 
The documentation shall show that the search for vulnerabilities is systematic. 
[AVA_VLA.3.3C] 
X 
ocumentation shall justify that the analysis completely addresses th
deliverables. [AVA_VLA.4.4C] 
valuator action elements:  
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for 
content and presentation of evidence. [AVA_VLA.1.1E] 
X 
aluator shall conduct penetration testing, building on the developer vulnerability 
analysis, to ensure identified vulnerabilities have been addressed. 
[AVA_VLA.1.2E] 
aluator shall perform an independent vulnerability analysis to the rigor 
D
The d lities. X 
C
The d e TOE X 
E
The ev X 
The ev
[assignment: degree of DTRA-defined rigor]. [AVA_VLA.2.3E - refined] 
X 
The evaluator shall perform independent penetration testing, based on the independent 
vulnerability analysis, to determine the exploitability of additional identified 
vulnerabilities in the DTRA monitoring environment. [AVA_VLA.2.4E - refined] 
X 
The evaluator shall determine the degree of resistance of the TOE to penetration attacks 
based on [assignment: DTRA list of vulnerability types]. [AVA_VLA.2.5E - EXP] 
X 
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B ANNEX: OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE 
 
B.1 DTRA Requirements 
The DTRA will be acting in several roles for the assessment of the ISMS and future monitoring systems.  
The subset of the responsibilities within these roles impacting the technical efficacy of the assessment is 
as follows: 
B.1.1 Set the requirements for the developer of the equipment. 
B.1.2 Agree the level of threat to be addressed by the combination of deployed equipment. 
B.1.3 Agree the appropriate AAL to be applied to a specific equipment. 
B.1.4 Provide the appropriate equipment to perform the monitoring function. 
B.1.5 Provide the appropriate information to technicians installing and maintaining the 
equipment. 
B.1.6 Provide the appropriate information to inspectors for determining that the equipment 
remains secure during its operation.  
B.1.7 Provide appropriate infrastructure for handling monitoring information appropriately,.  
B.1.8 Set standards for the technical expertise, independence and working methods of 
assessors. 
B.1.9 Provide configuration information for equipment, either in lieu of or in supplement to 
developer information.  
 
Although these requirements could be expressed in [CC] terms, they are not the focus of this paper. 
However, DTRA will need to ensure that these requirements are included in the overall monitoring 
process and procedures. 
 
